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Unethical Protection? Model Rule
1.8(h) and Plan Releases of
Professional Liability
by
George W. Kuney*
INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
address the propriety of attorneys obtaining releases from their clients of either past claims or future claims against themselves. Under the applicable
Model Rule, both types of releases require the involvement, or the opportunity for involvement, of independent counsel to review and advise the client
on the issue.
Releases in chapter 11 plans typically cover insiders, members of the creditors' committee, and the debtor's and committee's counsel. Few courts or
disciplinary bodies of the various state bars have addressed the ethical issues
that arise when counsel insert into a plan of reorganization a lengthy provision that releases counsel from all past claims and all future claims arising out
of the chapter 11 case or the plan of reorganization.
This article examines the interaction of Model Rule 1.8(h) and plan release practice, concludes there is a conflict between practice and the Model
Rule, and suggests a solution: making inclusion of a third-party release covering estate-compensated counsel an issue to be negotiated, reviewed, and approved as part of the process of retention of professionals early in the case,
before parties rely on the availability of a release when rendering services. If
the proper scope of a permissible release of professional liability is confronted
early in the chapter 11 process, the Model Rule (or, more accurately, its
locally-enacted analogue) can be complied with, and the effect of the release's
availability or non-availability on fee structures and other elements of compensation can be made explicit.
*W.P. Toms Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the James L. Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law at The University of Tennessee College of Law, http://www.law.utk.edu/faculty/
kuney/index.shtml. The author thanks Professor Nancy B. Rapoport and attorneys Robert R. Barnes and
Donna C. Looper for their comments on earlier drafts and Walter C. Machnicki, University of Tennessee

College of Law Class of 2010, for his research assistance.
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I. MODEL RULE 1.8(H) AND ITS VARIANTS
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h) provides:
A lawyer shall not:
(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is
independently represented in making the agreement; or
(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with
an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is
advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith.1
It is important to note that the rule does not prohibit lawyers from entering into an agreement settling or releasing claims or possible claims of malpractice. 2 The rule does, however, recognize the lawyer's probable superior
knowledge and bargaining power in this aspect of the attorney-client relationship, requiring that the client (1) be advised in writing that seeking independent counsel is prudent and (2) be given an opportunity to seek out that
independent counsel.
All states have adopted Model Rule 1.8(h), its predecessor Disciplinary
Rule 6-102, 3 or a close variant of those rules. 4 Some states appear absolutely
iMODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (2007).
2

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

'MODEL

CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY

1.8

cmt. 15

(2007).

DR 6-102(A) (1981); see also id. EC 6-6 ("A lawyer who

handles the affairs of his client properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional
activities and one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly should not be permitted to do so.").
4

See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h);
ARiZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); CAL. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT
CONDUCT R.

1.8(h);

R. 3-400; CoLo.

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.8(h);

R. 1.8(h); CONN.

D.C.

RULES OF PROF'L

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.8(g); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 4-1.8(h); GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); HAw.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); ILL. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(0; IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); IowA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 32:1.8(h); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); Ky. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.130(1.8(h)); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); ME. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); MD.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); MAss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); MiCH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); Miss. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.8(h); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.8(h); NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-501.8; NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h);
N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); NJ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); N.M. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-108.H; N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); N.C. REV. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); OHio RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.8(h); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); PA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.8(h); TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.08(g); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); VT.
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to prohibit prospective waivers, 5 while others allow them if the client is independently represented. 6 Still others have enactments that are drafted ambiguously, most often due to confusion over which clause is modifying which
provision?7 In some jurisdictions, it appears that, although the literal rule as
adopted would absolutely prohibit prospective waivers of malpractice liability, the courts have interpreted the prohibition to be subject to exceptions.,
II. RELEASE AND INDEMNIFICATION PROVISIONS IN PLANS
OF REORGANIZATION
In a chapter 11 case, the debtor's and the creditors committee's professionals often seek to limit or eliminate the risk of liability they may incur
while employed in the case. 9 These provisions are included in "third-party
releases" or "plan releases." They appear as part of the plan the bankruptcy
court confirms or as part of an order the court issues that eliminates liability
and enjoins potential plaintiffs from initiating or continuing all or certain
types of litigation related to a bankruptcy case against non-debtor third parties, such as the debtor's insiders' ° and the debtor's accountants, lawyers, and
other professionals. Although a release is a contractual term that one would
not ordinarily expect to find in an order, bankruptcy court orders often incorporate by reference plans, loan agreements, sale agreements, and other documents that are attached as exhibits. In this sense, then, the order contains the
release. It is also possible for a release to be inserted into proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law submitted to the court for consideration and
entry.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(h); VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); W.VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

20:1.8(h); Wyo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h).

'See, e.g., Bar Ass'n of City of New York Comm. on Profl and Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 1989-3 (1989).
6
See, e.g.,S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm., Adv. Op. 03-01 (2003) (allowing a prospective waiver of
liability if the client is independently represented); Penn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Profl Resp.,
Informal Op. No. 2004-24 (2004) (allowing a prospective waiver of liability if the client is independently
represented); Or. St. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2005-165 (2005) (allowing a prospective waiver of liability if
the 7client is independently represented).
See, e.g. In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 356 B.R. 239, 261 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (distinguishing the
"retroactive" waiver of claims that occurs in a reorganization plan from a prospective waiver and settlement of claims and holding that "retroactive" waivers comply with Florida's version of rule 1.8); In re
Fazande, 864 So. 2d 174, 180 (La. 2004) (noting that rule 1.8(h)(2) only applies to the settlement of a
malpractice claim and does not require written notification before negotiation of a settlement).
'See, e.g., In re LeBlanc, 884 So. 2d 552, 557-58 (La. 2004) (holding that an attorney's unconditional
tender of payment to a client with a malpractice claim, unaccompanied by a waiver, did not violate rule
1.8(h)).

9Ralph Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11:Revisiting Jurisdictional Precepts
and the Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANKR. L. J. 1, 2-4 (1998).
lo 1lU.S.C. § 101(3 1) defines "insider" and essentially focuses on identifying those in control of or in a
position to control the debtor.
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Third-party releases have not been accepted in all circuits, nor have they
been unqualifiedly approved even when they have been accepted." But in
circuits where they are accepted, they have evolved from releases of entities,
such as guarantors, co-liable with the debtor on prepetition obligations, to
broad releases of directors, officers, and estate professionals from liability to
the debtor, creditors, interest holders, and any number of other parties in
interest for postpetition, and even postconfirmation, acts and omissions. A
fairly typical third-party release provision might read:
Neither the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, the Creditors' Committee, nor any of their respective present members, officers, directors, employees, advisors, attorneys,
agents, or other representatives shall have or incur any liability to any Creditor, Interest Holder or any other party in
interest, or any of their respective agents, employees, representatives, financial advisors, attorneys, or affiliates, or any of
their successors or assigns, for any act or omission in connection with, relating to or arising out of the chapter 11 Cases,
the pursuit of confirmation of the Plan, the consummation of
the Plan, or the administration of the Plan or the property to
be distributed under the Plan, except for their willful misconduct, and in all respects shall be entitled to reasonably
rely upon the advice of counsel with respect to their duties
and responsibilities under the Plan.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Plan, all
Creditors, Interest Holders, other parties in interest, and any
of their respective agents, employees, representatives, financial advisors, attorneys, or affiliates, and any successors or
assigns of the foregoing or any professionals retained by
them, shall have no right of action against the Debtor, the
Reorganized Debtor, the Creditors' Committee, or any of
their respective present or former members, officers, directors, employees, advisors, attorneys, or agents, for any act or
omission in connection with, relating to or arising out of the
chapter 11 Cases, the pursuit of confirmation of the Plan, the
consummation of the Plan, or the administration of the Plan
or the property to be distributed under the Plan, except for
their willful misconduct, and each such Person is expressly
enjoined from asserting or commencing any such action.
"See GERALD L. BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE AND PREVENTION, § 12:42 (2d

ed. 2007) (citing decisions that have invalidated plans of reorganization as violating 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) by
discharging parties other than the debtor).
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On the Effective Date, each of the Debtors and Reorganized Debtors shall be deemed to have settled, released and
waived any and all claims, suits and/or causes of action of
any nature whatsoever that any of the Debtors or Reorganized Debtors holds or might hold or assert against any officer, director, agent, employee, advisor, accountant or
attorney of any Debtor serving in such capacity immediately
prior to the Effective Date.1a

This release is broad enough to trigger both subsections of Model Rule
1.8(h). It is both a prospective release - applying to claims "for any act or
omission in connection with, relating to or arising out of the chapter 11
Cases, the pursuit of confirmation of the Plan, the consummation of the Plan,
or the administration of the Plan or the property to be distributed under the
Plan" - and a settlement of any existing claim or potential claim for such
liability - "each of the Debtors and Reorganized Debtors shall be deemed to
have settled, released and waived any and all claims . . . that any of the
Debtors or Reorganized Debtors holds or might hold or assert against any ...
attorney." By releasing all claims "except for [those arising from] their willful
misconduct," the release covers ordinary malpractice claims based on negligence, as well as claims based on gross negligence often not permitted under
otherwise applicable non-bankruptcy law. 13
A similar provision from a recent case demonstrates that the practice
continues, arguably in a slightly more elaborate form, by splitting the provision between two release provisions and a defined term:
Exculpation and Limitation of Liability. Except as
otherwise specifically provided in this Plan and the Plan
Supplement, the Debtor, Reorganized RoomStore, the Creditors' Committee, the current and former members of the
Creditors' Committee in their capacities as such, and any of
such parties' respective present officers, directors, employees,
advisors, attorneys, representatives, financial advisors, investment bankers, or agents and any of such parties' successors and assigns, shall not have or incur, and are hereby
"2First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re APF,
Co., No. 98-1596-PJW (Bankr. D. Del. May 27, 1999) (section of plan entitled "Exculpation and Limitation of Liability").
3
The enforceability of pre-dispute waivers of negligence and gross negligence is beyond the scope of
this article. In general, however, waivers of negligence in commercial transactions that do not implicate
the public interest are valid, whereas waivers of gross negligence are often not. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965) ("A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to
accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such
harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy").
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released from, any claim, obligation, Cause of Action, or liability to one another or to any Claimholder or Interestholder, or any other party in interest, or any of their
respective agents, employees, representatives, financial advisors, attorneys or Affiliates, or any of their successors or assigns, for any act or omission in connection with, relating to,
or arising out of the filing the Chapter 11 Case, negotiation
and filing of this Plan, the pursuit of confirmation of this
Plan, the consummation of this Plan, the administration of
this Plan or the property to be distributed under this Plan,
except for their fraud, gross negligence or willful misconduct,
and in all respects shall be entitled to reasonably rely upon
the advice of counsel with respect to their duties and responsibilities under this Plan.14
This provision encompasses both claims that have arisen during the approximately five years that the case was pending pre-confirmation as well as
those that might arise in the future during the "the consummation of this
Plan, the administration of this Plan or the property to be distributed under
this Plan." 15 The plan in the case also contains another release:
Release by Debtor of Certain Parties. Pursuant to section 1123(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, as of the Effective
Date, the Debtor, in its individual capacity and as a debtor in
possession for and on behalf of its Estate, shall release and
discharge and be deemed to have conclusively, absolutely,
unconditionally, irrevocably and forever released, waived
and discharged all Released Parties for and from any and all
claims, obligations, rights, Causes of Action, and liabilities,
existing as of the Effective Date in any manner arising from,
based on or relating to, in whole or in part, the Debtor, the
subject matter of, or the transactions or events giving rise to,
any Claim or Interest that is treated in this Plan, the busi' 4Amended and Restated Joint Plan of Reorganization Proposed by HMY Roomstore, Inc. and the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors § 10.4, In re Heilig-Meyers Co., No. 00-34533-DOT (Bankr.
E.D.Va. March 9, 2005) (Docket No. 5843). The Heilig-Meyers plan was incorporated by reference into
the order confirming the plan, which is really a combination of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an
order confirming the plan. See Order of Confirmation at 25, § D(4), In re Heilig-Meyers Co., No. 0034533-DOT (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 18, 2005) (Docket No. 6047). While incorporation of the plan into the
confirmation order, findings, and conclusions is not the practice in all jurisdictions, in the author's experience it is not at all uncommon.
SAmended and Restated Joint Plan of Reorganization Proposed by HMY Roomstore, Inc. and the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors § 10.4, In re Heilig-Meyers Co., No. 00-34533 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. March 9, 2005) (Docket No. 5843).
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ness or contractual arrangements between the Debtor or any
Released Party, the restructuring of Claims and Interests
prior to or in the Chapter 11 Case, or any act, omission,
occurrence or event in any manner related to any such
Claims, Interests, restructuring or the Chapter 11 Case. Reorganized RoomStore shall be bound, to the same extent the
6
Debtor is bound, by all of the releases set forth above.'
This second release requires that one look to the definition of the term
"Released Parties" to see that it also covers the debtor's and the committee's
counsel, supplementing the protections of the prior release provision in a
"belt and suspenders" fashion:
"Released Parties" means, collectively, (i) all officers, directors, employees, consultants, agents, financial advisors, attorneys and other representatives of the Debtor which
served in such capacities on and subsequent to the Petition
Date; (ii) the Creditors' Committee, including its agents, financial advisors, and attorneys in their capacities as such,
and all current and former members of the Creditors' Committee in their capacities as such; and (iii) with respect to
each of the above-named Persons, such Person's affiliates,
principals, employees, agents, officers, directors, financial advisors, attorneys and other professionals, in their capacities
as such.

17

These releases have become a staple of reorganization practice and may
even be evolving into broad indemnification provisions that shift the burden
of paying for enforcing the release from the insiders and professionals to the
18
debtor or the estate.
III. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MODEL RULE AND
REORGANIZATION PRACTICE
A plan of reorganization is a collective contract between the debtor, its
estate, its creditors, its interest holders, its administrative and other priority
claimants, and other parties in interest.' 9 When the plan, usually drafted by
161d. at § 10.5.
171d. at § 1.89.
"SSee, e.g., Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Pelofsky (In re Thermadyne Holdings Corp.), 283 B.R.
749, 756-57 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002) (upholding bankruptcy court's disapproval of such a provision but
emphasizing there is no per se prohibition on such provisions which should be subjected to a determination
of their reasonableness on a case-by-case basis).
'9It is necessary to differentiate between creditors and claimants due to the definitional structure of
the bankruptcy code. "Creditors" are entities that hold claims arising or deemed to arise prior to the
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the debtor's attorneys, includes a release like the ones set out above, it runs
squarely up against Model Rule 1.8. Yet the problem appears to have been
all but ignored in practice, and the decisions citing Model Rule 1.8 do not
address the rule's applicability in chapter 11 cases. No evidence suggests that
debtors are told to seek independent counsel to advise them on whether a
release should be included, and if so, at what cost to the attorneys involved.
This section of the article explores whether federal bankruptcy law preempts
or precludes 20 Model Rule 1.8, and if not, what the consequences of a violapetition date. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (2007). They are thus a subset of claimants, a group that includes
holders of claims arising both prepetition and postpetition.
2
°"Preemption" is generally the concept that a valid federal law on a subject will displace state law on
a subject if Congress intended to "occupy the field" or if state law conflicts with the federal law See
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); see, e.g., also In re John Richards Homes
Building Co., 298 B.R. 591, 594 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (concluding that 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) preempts
Florida homestead law allowing a debtor against whom an involuntary case had been filed in bad faith to
reach the wrongfully petitioning creditor's otherwise exempt home); Graber v. Fuqua, 279 S.W.3d 608,
612 (Tex. 2009) (presenting an implied preemption analysis based upon two categories or types of bankruptcy laws-(a) those that were "custom-built" for bankruptcy like 11 U.S.C. §§ 301 (voluntary petitions), 302 (involuntary petitions), 362 (automatic stay) and (b) those that were merely imported from
general federal law such as the 7000-series of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure-and noting that
where bankruptcy law is custom-built, "preemption is more likely because when Congress crafted new,
unique provisions, it probably contemplated whether or not to exclude overlapping state law remedial
schemes").
Claim or issue preclusion is generally the result of a court determination by order or judgment that
precludes a party from seeking contrary relief in that court or another forum. Claim preclusion is addressed through the doctrine of res judicata. See Taylor v. Sturgell, _ U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171 n.5
(2008) ("The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are
collectively referred to as 'res judicata.' Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses
successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues
as the earlier suit. Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually
litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs
in the context of a different claim. By preclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that they have had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate, these two doctrines protect against the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] reliance on judicial action by minimizing
the possibility of inconsistent decisions.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Interestingly, however, in the bankruptcy context, the terms "preemption" and "preclusion" have become somewhat confused or conflated, perhaps due to the interaction of the bankruptcy court's order
confirming the plan, the plan itself, and Code sections 1123(a)(5) and 1142(a). See Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. Cal. ex rel Cal. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control, 350 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We hold
that a reorganization plan proposed under § 1123(a)(5) expressly preempts otherwise applicable non-bankruptcy laws only to the extent that such laws were already preempted before the addition of the 'notwithstanding' clause to § 1123(a) by amendment in 1984. That is, we hold that the addition of the
'notwithstanding' clause to § 1123(a) was merely a clarification and confirmation of the preemptive effect
of a reorganization plan that already existed under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. That preemptive effect,
expressly stated in the 'notwithstanding' clause of § 1142(a), was limited to otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy laws 'relating to financial condition.'"); In re Pub. Serv. Co., 108 B.R. 854, 882 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1989), vacated as moot, June 28, 1991 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) broadly and expressly causes
plan terms to preempt otherwise applicable non-bankruptcy law).
The distinction between preemption or claim preclusion in the context of plan releases of professionals
is a distinction without a difference, however. Whether a court finds either that the release in the plan,

PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY RELEASES

2009)

tion of the rule would be. It sets the stage for section IV's suggested solution: disclosure of the possibility of such a release when counsel is retained,
and if one is included in the plan, again when the disclosure statement is
approved and the plan confirmed to determine if the release is reasonably
necessary, if the release has been adequately explained to the client, and if the
client has been given the opportunity to seek independent counsel regarding
the release's inclusion in the plan.
A.

THE EFFECT OF PREEMPTION OR CLAIM PRECLUSION ON RULE

1.8's

LOCAL VARIANT

Because bankruptcy courts at least implicitly 21 approve releases when
plans containing them are confirmed, once those orders are final, the releases
arguably preempt or preclude state law in the field of bankruptcy. 22 This is
an attractive position to those favoring a broadly preemptive approach to
bankruptcy, but one that probably goes too far. After all, federal courts retain the right to admit attorneys to practice before them but generally leave
licensure and discipline of lawyers to the states.2 3 A broad preemptive approach would fundamentally undermine this system. Presumably, then, while
the confirmation order might bar malpractice claims against counsel, it would
not bar state disciplinary proceedings against them. In other words, release
of the claim does not necessarily cure the violation of the ethical rule or block
24
disciplinary action for improper actions taken to obtain the release.
through the confirmation order and sections 1123(a)(5) and 1142(a), preempts applicable nonbankruptcy

law that would otherwise support a plaintiffs claims, or that the plaintiffs claims have been precluded by
the terms of the plan, the plaintiff is still left without a claim to prosecute, and the professional is still left
with a defense to the claim based upon the release.
21See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
22
Philip Blumberg, The Continuity of the EnterpriseDoctrine: Corporate Successorship in United States
Law, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 365, 415 (1996) (discussing preemption in the context of successor liability and
plan injunctions purporting to bar such claims and stating that "the bankruptcy law generally preempts
state law insofar as implementation of plans of reorganization and other post-petition judicially approved
dispositions of the debtor's assets are conceived.")
23See Thomas D. Morgan, It's Not Perfect, but the ABA Does a Key Job in State-Based Regulation of
Lawyers, 11 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 381, 381 (2007); Nancy B. Rapoport, The Intractable Problem of Bankruptcy Ethics: Square Peg, Round Hole, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PPAc. 391, 398 (2002); Larry D. Thompson,
The McDade Law: Necessary forJusticeor a Burden for Federal Attorneys?, FED. LAW. Jan. 2001 at 20, 22
(2001).
24
But see Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2000). In Pertuso, the debtors
claimed that the discharge injunction had been violated and sought to pursue state law unjust enrichment
and accounting causes of action. The court conducted an implied preemption analysis and found that
allowing the debtors to assert "a host of state law causes of action to redress wrongs under the Bankruptcy
Code would undermine the uniformity the Code endeavors to preserve and would stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishments and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. at 426 (internal
quotations and citations omitted); See also Joubert v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. (In re Joubert),
411 F.3d 452, 456 (3d Cir. 2005) (questioning whether the Bankruptcy Code creates implied private
causes of action).
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If a plan of reorganization does not preempt or preclude actions under the
local analogue of Model Rule 1.8-rather than under applicable non-bankruptcy law regarding professional malpractice-then what is the result of the
rule's violation? First, although the practice of including these releases in
plans is widespread, there has apparently been little or no action on the part
of disciplinary officials to examine or address the practice. 25 Second, few, if
any, bankruptcy attorneys or judges refer the act of proposing or adopting
such releases to the various states' disciplinary authorities.2 6 Because every
attorney appearing in a bankruptcy case holds at least one state bar license,
why don't these attorneys recognize the prohibition of releases obtained in
violation of an attorney's ethical obligations? The problem, then, is not only
that these releases are inserted into plans of reorganization without regard for
the rules of professional conduct, but also that nobody involved apparently
recognizes the ethical implications and violations.
B.

THE EFFECT OF THE RELEASE ON A MALPRACTICE PLAINTIFF'S

CLAIM

An order confirming a plan is no longer subject to appeal once ten days
have passed after its entry. 2 7 At that point the order can only be revoked
28
within 180 days and on the ground that the order was procured by fraud.
This limitation is strictly construed and applied. 29 So, in other words, eleven
days after confirmation, the confirmation order and any release constitute a
final order entitled to full faith and credit, and on the 181st day after entry,
the confirmation order and release can no longer be revoked by the bankruptcy court. Arguably, applying the literal meaning of these plan releases,
malpractice claims against covered professionals paid by the estate are barred
as of the confirmation date or effective date of the plan, whether or not the
professionals' final fee applications have been granted. It is doubtful that a
bankruptcy court would adopt this interpretation. It is far more likely that

the plan will be seen as part of the larger chapter 11 case, as are the final fee
applications, which are referenced in many plans in order to comply with the
25

Most but not all federal courts apply the rules of professional conduct of the state in which they sit.
See Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice,
58 SMU L. REV. 3, 10-11 (2005).
26
The author has never heard of such a report or referral ever being made in this context and his
research has not found any examples.
27
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a).
2811 U.S.C. § 1144.
29
Mickowski v. Visi-Trak Worldwide, LLC, 415 F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that under 11
U.S.C. § 1144 an order of confirmation cannot be revoked absent a showing of fraud in obtaining the
confirmation order itself); In re Errington, 39 B.R. 968, 971 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (holding that 11 U.S.C.
§ 1144 is the exclusive method Congress provided for the revocation of an order of confirmation); First
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Bishop (In re Bishop), 74 B.R. 677, 680 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987).
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requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(4).30 The more likely interpretation,
then, would lead to claim preclusion barring claims of malpractice only after
a final fee application has been approved. 3' It is unclear whether, if a plan
release has been approved and is effective, relief at the final fee application
stage is limited to denial of the fees involved, or if affirmative relief in terms
of a money damage award against the professional is also possible. That issue
is beyond the scope of this article.
3011

U.S.C. § 1129(a)(4) declares that the court cannot confirm a plan unless:

Any payment made or to be made by the proponent, by the debtor, or by a person
issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan, for services or for costs and
expenses in or in connection with the case, or in connection with the plan and
incident to the case, has been approved by, or is subject to the approval of, the
court as reasonable.
3
Claim preclusion (res judicata) prevents parties from litigating the same case more than once. Under
federal law, the doctrine has three elements: (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) an identity of the causes
of action, and (3) an identity of the parties or their privies. Golden v. Barenborg, 53 F.3d 866, 869 (7th
Cir. 1995). The defendant must raise the defense and has the burden of proving all of the elements. See,
e.g., Osherow v.Ernst & Young, LLP (In re Intelogic Trace, Inc.), 200 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing
Nilson v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1983); Stangel v. Perkins, 87 S.W.3d 706, 710
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Intelogic Trace for the federal requirements). After a final fee application is
approved, the elements for a claim preclusion defense in a subsequent malpractice action will typically be
met. See, e.g., Iannochino v. Rodolakis (In re lannochino), 242 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2001). Issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel), in contrast, requires that (1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in
the prior action, (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior action, and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior action must have been a part of the judgment in that earlier action. Id,
In Iannochino, for example, the court held that the chapter 7 debtors' action for malpractice against
their former attorney was barred by res judicata, because the bankruptcy court had previously awarded
attorney's fees that the debtors had disputed. The court stated that:
the bankruptcy court must undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the services
listed in a fee application when determining whether to award fees. Under section
330, the bankruptcy court must consider "the nature, the extent, and the value of
such services."A bankruptcy court therefore makes an implied 'finding of quality
and value' in the professional services provided to the lannochinos during the
bankruptcy.
Id. at 46 (internal citations and quotations omitted). For similar, oft-cited cases, see Grausz v. Englander,
321 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2003), and Shaw v. Replogle (In re Shaw), Nos. C 00-2820 CRB, 98-3-1299-DM,
99-3-0401-TC, 2000 WL 1897344 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2000). See also Intelogic Trace, 200 F.3d at 389
(noting that while the debtor's board of directors "may not have been aware of all the precise facts or
reached a firm conclusion," the board's documented concerns were sufficient to give rise to res judicata);
Indus. Clearinghouse, Inc. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 338 B.R. 703, 715 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding breach of fiduciary duty claims against trustee barred by res judicata effect of final fee application
approval, although the debtors did not contest the fee application, and stating that "the law of the Fifth
Circuit does not require a party to have understood the legal implications of the facts giving rise to a claim
in order for the claim to be barred by res judicata"); but see Pipkin v. Henry & Peters, P.C. (In re R & C
Petroleum, Inc.), 236 B.R. 355, 359-60 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that when plaintiffs only learn of
the malpractice after the bankruptcy court has approved a fee application, the action will not be barred);
Brunacini v. Kavanaugh, 869 P.2d 821, 827 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a claim for legal malpractice is not subject to res judicata because the claim is tolled during the pendency of an appeal from the fee
award).
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IV. A SOLUTION: DISCLOSURE AND APPROVAL AT THE
TIME OF RETENTION
Model Rule 1.8(h) and its local analogues generally prohibit attorneys
from obtaining releases of either past claims or future claims against themselves from their clients. Under the Rule, both types of releases require the
involvement, or at least the opportunity for involvement, of independent
counsel to review and advise the client on the issue.
But chapter 11 debtors' counsel are inserting provisions releasing themselves and committee counsel from past and future claims in plans of reorganization. These releases appear to be binding under either a preemption or
preclusion analysis even if they violate the ethical rule. This is true not only
because of the preemptive or preclusive effect of a final, unappealed plan confirmation order but also because of the preclusive effect of an order granting a
final fee award to counsel. Yet many federal courts employ their own disciplinary rules identical or similar to the disciplinary rules of the state in
which they sit, including provisions like Model Rule 1.8(h).
How then to address both the practice of gaining these releases and addressing compliance with Model Rule 1.8(h)? One answer: disclosure early
in the process as part of the hearing on retention of counsel, as well as repeated disclosure during the disclosure statement and plan confirmation
process.
Debtor's and committee counsel's retention and the terms of retention
must be approved by the court at the inception of the post-petition representation if they are to be paid from the estate. 32 Typically, and prudently,
counsel in these situations use a retention agreement, often in the form of a
letter, outlining the terms of the representation. The key terms are typically
presented to the court in the application to employ, to which the full retention agreement is often attached. If a retention agreement features an indemnity provision, prudent professionals disclose it in the retention agreement
and employment application. 33 Because a plan release has a similar liabilitylimiting (or eliminating) role, counsel should disclose it and negotiate whether
it is appropriate at the time of employment.
Professionals arguing for releases at plan confirmation may claim they
need them in order to take on the representation. But courts should be skeptical about these assertions. No case has been identified where, faced with
the lack of a plan release, counsel has countered with a demand for higher
3211 U.S.C. § 327.
3

See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Pelofsky (In re Thermadyne Holdings Corp.), 283 B.R.
749, 752 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002). The inclusion of indemnity provisions for estate professionals is a fairly
recent development and stands at odds with the traditional rule of practice in much of the country:
debtors do not indemnify. Exploration of the evolution of indemnity provisions in retention agreements,
plans of reorganization, and other bankruptcy transactional documents is beyond the scope of this article.
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fees. Nor is there a reported decision reflecting discounted attorneys' fees
based on the availability of a limitation- or elimination-of-liability provision in
34
a plan.
When independent counsel does review a proposed release, they should
consider whether the waiver might cause counsel seeking it to be sloppier
about their work. After all, the original reason for prohibiting such releases
was to prevent lawyers from doing less-than-adequate work and asking their
clients to forgive the inadequacy. 35 Counsel should also consider what independent consideration, such as decreased fees or other preferred billing practices, might be extended to a debtor willing to commit to release of
professional liability claims in and arising out of the successful 36 chapter 11
case.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h) and
modern third-party release practice in chapter 11 cases has been largely ignored by courts and case law. Current practice lends preemptive or claim
preclusive effect to bankruptcy court orders confirming plans containing
these releases, and enforcement of these releases runs counter to the disciplinary and ethical functions of state disciplinary authorities. Full disclosure of
the potential for such a release early in the case as part of the process of
retaining professionals can alleviate the problem, allowing considered analysis
of the appropriateness of broad plan releases sheltering professionals from
malpractice and other liability.

34

The cost of malpractice coverage is presumably already bundled into professional fees, along with
other overhead such as office rent, non-billing support staff, computers, and other equipment. But if pro,
fessionals can show the need for the proposed release, it could be approved at the employment stage of the
case, or approval could be reserved for later, and the debtor (or creditors' committee) can be advised to
seek independent counsel to review the form and substance of the release and whether it is appropriate to
have such a provision in the plan. Of course, the retention of independent counsel to advise the debtor
regarding the release who will be paid from the estate would first require court approval, in accordance
with 11 U.S.C. § 327.
"Comment 14 to Model Rule 1.8 begins: "Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for
malpractice are prohibited unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement because
they are likely to undermine competent and diligent representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 14 (2007).
"6Successful in the sense that a plan of some sort is confirmed, as that is the document in which the
releases described in this article are found. There are certainly other measures of success in chapter 11,
including settlement with critical creditors and dismissal of the case or the preservation of a business
through a sale of substantially all of its assets as a going concern under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) and (). These
other forms of success and the possibility that a release of professional liability could be validly included in
the relevant transactional documents or court orders are beyond the scope of this article.

